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Securities & Exchange
Commission vs. Elon Musk & the
First Amendment
Jerry W. Markham†
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.1

Abstract
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is responsible
for administering the federal securities laws, which mandate the content
and timing of information disseminated to shareholders of public
companies. SEC regulations adopted under those statutes are claimed
to be exempt from First Amendment protection because they only
regulate “commercial” speech. Such speech has been historically denied
full First Amendment protection. However, an SEC enforcement action
brought against Telsa, Inc. and its chief executive officer Elon Musk
demonstrates the danger of the SEC’s unrestrained application of the
commercial speech doctrine to viewpoint-based speech. Through that
action, the SEC is causing the censorship of Musk’s “tweets” on Twitter
concerning his often-controversial views on the role and success of
Tesla’s electronic automobiles in combating climate change, one of the
most critical political and social issues of our time. This Article argues
that the SEC should cease regulation of viewpoint-based speech on
Twitter and other social media. The rough and tumble world of social
media, and its now central role in the public debate on vital political
and social issues, deserves full First Amendment protection.
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1.

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).

339

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Securities & Exchange Commission vs. Elon Musk & the First Amendment
D. SEC Speech Restrictions Negated by Public Debate............................ 360
E. SEC Mandated Self-Censorship Through Monitoring Requirements ... 361
F. SEC Regulation of Speech through Demeanor and Facial
Expressions ........................................................................................ 362
G. SEC Compelled Speech on Political Issues – Proxy Regulations......... 364
H. SEC Compelled “Shaming” Speech – Proxy Votes on Social Issues ... 366
I. SEC Compelled Shaming Speech – Executive Compensation Proxy
Votes ................................................................................................. 367
J. SEC Compelled Shaming Speech – “Conflict Diamonds” .................... 369
K. SEC Compelled Shaming Speech – Climate Change Disclosures......... 369
IV. First Amendment Protection for Musk on Twitter............... 371
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 378

Introduction
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is responsible
for the administration of the federal securities laws, which mandate the
content and timing of information disseminated to shareholders of
public companies.2 SEC regulations are generally held to be exempt
from First Amendment protection because they regulate only “commer–
cial” speech.3 Such discourse is said to be unworthy of the broad First
Amendment protections given to political and social speech.4 An SEC
enforcement action brought against Tesla, Inc. and its chief executive
officer Elon Musk demonstrates the danger of the SEC’s unrestrained
application of the commercial-speech doctrine to viewpoint-based
speech on social media.5 Through that action, the SEC is effectively
censoring Musk’s “tweets.”6 Those postings concern his often
2.

See generally Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street
(3d ed. 2003) (describing the history and role of the SEC).

3.

See Russell G. Ryan, The Federal Securities Laws, the First Amendment
and Commercial Speech: A Call for Consistency, 59 St. John’s L. Rev.
57, 67–71 (1984) (describing the application of the “commercial speech”
doctrine to federal securities laws).

4.

See, e.g., Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s
Application to Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 789, 790–92 (2007)
(observing that “an impressive list of commentators” have argued that
the First Amendment should not apply to securities regulation, but
asserting that arguments supporting that claim are unpersuasive); Karl
M.F. Lockhart, A ‘Corporate Democracy’? Freedom of Speech and the
SEC, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1593, 1598–99 (2018) (examining limitations on
free speech imposed by federal securities laws); Lloyd L. Drury, Disclosure
is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment Constraints on SEC
Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 757 (2007) (same).

5.

Complaint at 3, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (SEC) v. Musk, No. 1:18-cv8865 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018), ECF No. 1.

6.

See Consent Motion for Entry of Final Judgment at 13 ex.2, SEC v. Musk,
No. 1:18-cv-8865 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 16, 2018), ECF No. 14; see also Knight
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controversial views on the role of Tesla’s all-electric automobiles in
combating climate change, one of the most important political and
social issues of our time.7
This Article argues that the SEC should cease regulating viewpointbased speech on Twitter and other social media. The rough-and-tumble
world of those Internet-based forums and their central role in the public
debate on critical social and political issues deserve full First Amend–
ment protection.

I. The Elon Musk Twitter Controversy
Tesla’s core mission is “to accelerate the advent of sustainable
transport by bringing compelling mass market electric cars to market
as soon as possible.”8 As Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk is the leader of that
effort.9 Although Tesla’s popular production models did not start

First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230–31 (2d Cir. 2019)
(describing Twitter and how its participants interact with each other).
7.

See Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk; Tesla’s Work ‘Supersedes Political
Parties, Race, Creed, Religion’, CNBC (Nov. 6, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/05/elon-musk-teslas-work-is-importantto-the-future-of-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/NC9X-WNWR]. Musk
and Tesla are also developing solar energy systems for residential housing.
Ashlee Vance, Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a
Fantastic Future 16 (2015). Musk is separately pursuing the
commercial exploitation of space and colonization of Mars through
SpaceX, the reconstruction of the nation’s infrastructure through the
Boring Company, and the linkage of computers with the human brain
through the Neuralink Corporation. Id. at 22; Aarian Marshall, Elon
Musk’s Boring Company Inches Closer to Making Hyperloop a Reality,
Wired (Apr. 19, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/elonmusks-boring-company-takes-small-step-toward-reality/ [https://perma.cc/
JBR6-9ARH]; Daniela Hernandez & Heather Mack, Elon Musk’s
Neuralink Shows Off Advances to Brain-Computer Interface, Wall St.
J. (July 17, 2019, 3:05 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musksneuralink-advances-brain-computer-interface-11563334987 [https://perma.cc/
62US-7SQX].

8.

Elon Musk, The Mission of Tesla, Tesla (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www
.tesla.com/blog/mission-tesla [https://perma.cc/UM7F-WQRC].

9.

Musk became Tesla’s chairman in 2004 and its CEO in 2008. Abigail Hess,
How Tesla and Elon Musk Became Household Names, CNBC (Nov. 21,
2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/21/how-tesla-and-elonmusk-became-household-names.html [https://perma.cc/WBY3-SWZP].
Tesla issued stock to the public in 2010, which subjected it to SEC
regulations. See Timeline: Main Events in Tesla’s History as a Public
Company, Reuters (Aug. 10, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-tesla-musk-timeline/timeline-main-events-in-teslas-history-asa-public-company-idUSKBN1KV2A0 [https://perma.cc/7PXA-Q994].
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appearing until 2013,10 Tesla delivered to consumers roughly 245,000
all-electric vehicles in 2018.11 Tesla was then the world’s leading
producer of all-electric motor vehicles,12 allowing the company to boast
that it was “starting to make a tangible impact on accelerating the
world to sustainable energy.”13
Musk is an avid user of Twitter.14 Many of his tweets express his
unique and controversial viewpoints15 on Tesla’s efforts to transform
the largely fossil-fuel-based automobile industry into a more eco-

10.

See Drake Baer, The Making of Tesla: Invention, Betrayal, And the Birth
of the Roadster, Bus. Insider (Nov. 11, 2014, 12:06 PM), https://www
.businessinsider.com/tesla-the-origin-story-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/C3X6MTS5].

11.

Tesla Q4 2018 Vehicle Production & Deliveries, Also Announcing $2,000
Price Reduction in US, Tesla (Jan. 2, 2019), https://ir.tesla.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/tesla-q4-2018-vehicle-production-deliveriesalso-announcing-2000 [https://perma.cc/MZ7X-AW7N].

12.

Kalyan Kumar, Tesla Model 3 Dominates US Electric Car Market with
60% of EV Sales, Int’l Bus. Times (Apr. 8, 2019, 10:47 AM), https://
www.ibtimes.com/tesla-model-3-dominates-us-electric-car-market-60-evsales-2783940 [https://perma.cc/8UKZ-LA6F]; see also Noel Randewich,
Tesla Becomes Most Valuable U.S. Car Maker, Edges Out GM, Reuters
(Apr. 10, 2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usastocks-tesla/tesla-becomes-most-valuable-u-s-car-maker-edges-out-gmidUSKBN17C1XF [https://perma.cc/3LK3-BRS4] (describing Tesla’s capital
market growth). In 2018, Tesla held a seventy-five percent share of the
U.S. all-electronic car market. See Kumar, supra.

13.

Tesla Q4 2018 Vehicle Production & Deliveries, Also Announcing $2,000
Price Reduction in US, supra note 11; see also Simon Alvarez, The Tesla
Effect is Reaching Critical Mass, and it Could Put Big Oil on the Defensive,
Teslarati (May 12, 2019), https://www.teslarati.com/tesla-effect-putsbig-oil-on-the-defensive/ [https://perma.cc/3N3X-PSVU] (describing Tesla’s
place within the growing electric-vehicle market).

14.

Matthew Goldstein & Emily Flitter, Tesla Chief Elon Musk is Sued by
S.E.C. in Move That Could Oust Him, N.Y. Times (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/business/elon-musk-sec-lawsuittesla.html [https://perma.cc/H668-AUBB].

15.

See, e.g., Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter (Aug. 25, 2018, 4:15 PM),
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1120502923136520192?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/6N8V-GGZD] (claiming that the cost of operating an
electric car is “much lower” than operating a gas-powered car); Andrew
J. Hawkins, How Tesla Changed the Auto Industry Forever, The Verge
(July 28, 2017, 6:58 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/28/16059954/
tesla-model-3-2017-auto-industry-influence-elon-musk [https://perma.cc/
KN6E-9MPY] (“[M]any are parsing over every tweet by CEO Elon Musk
for clues about the car’s cost, interior, and what sort of options will be
available.”).
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friendly industry.16 His tweets are often unstructured, erratic, in–
accurate, indecorous; they are also typically scathing about his critics.17
Nevertheless, Musk’s tweets are of broad public interest, as evidenced
by the fact that he has some twenty-eight million followers on Twitter.18
Those tweets are also intensely scrutinized, criticized, and widely
reported on by mass media and Internet blogs.19
The SEC brought an enforcement action against Tesla after Musk
tweeted in August 2018 that Tesla had secured financing that would
allow it to buy out public shareholders at a premium over existing
market prices.20 Tesla’s stock price then jumped over six percent, but
the plan to go private, if there ever was one, was abandoned a few

16.

See, e.g., Kristin Houser, 7 Ways Tesla is Changing Everything, Futurism
(Feb. 26, 2017), https://futurism.com/ready-for-edit-7-ways-tesla-ischanging-everything [https://perma.cc/U6FQ-V93H].

17.

See Rebecca Marston, The Weird and Wonderful Life of Elon Musk, BBC
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45560987 [https://
perma.cc/5E7X-QXP8] (describing Musk’s innovative, controversial, and
sometimes bizarre actions); Nathan Bomey, Why Does Tesla CEO Elon
Musk Keep Getting Himself into a Mess, USA Today (Sept. 7, 2018, 4:54
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2018/09/07/teslaceo-elon-musk-marijuana-controversy/1222499002/ [https://perma.cc/N7P6YZ5E] (describing a podcast during which Musk was apparently smoking
marijuana and describing his quarrels with the press). Musk also engaged
in a Twitter slanging match with a cave diver over the issue of how to
rescue some children trapped in a cave in Thailand. In the course of that
exchange, Musk referred to the diver as the “pedo guy.” The diver sued
Musk for defamation and sought $190 million in damages. Musk defended
his remark as being a mere taunt and testified that such insults were
common in the free wheeling world of Twitter. A jury found in favor of
Musk, leading a least one media source to claim that Twitter is effectively
immune from defamation complaints. Nichola Groom & Rachel Parsons,
Tesla Boss Elon Musk Wins Defamation Suit Over His ‘Pedo Guy’ Tweet,
Reuters (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-musklawsuit/tesla-boss-elon-musk-wins-defamation-trial-over-pedo-guy-tweetidUSKBN1YA13U [https://perma.cc/6UVD-7M25].

18.

See @elonmusk (Elon Musk), Trackalytics, https://www.trackalytics
.com/twitter/profile/elonmusk/ (last updated Dec. 27, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/5YAQ-TC92].

19.

See, e.g., Marston, supra note 17 (analyzing Musk’s history of “Twitter
outbursts”); Rachel Sandler, Elon Musk Continues Bizarre Twitter Use
Over A Wild Weekend, Forbes (June 17, 2019, 1:02 PM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2019/06/17/elon-musk-continues-bizarretwitter-use/#67e44d3d3598 [https://perma.cc/WAZ3-4RLK] (analyzing
a “strange series of tweets” Musk sent over one weekend).

20.

Elon Musk Charged with Securities Fraud for Misleading Tweets, SEC
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-219 [https://
perma.cc/H668-AUBB].
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weeks later.21 The SEC then sued Tesla and Musk, charging that his
tweet had misled investors because the funding for such a transaction
was not in place.22 The SEC sought to remove Musk from the manage–
ment of Tesla, bar him from acting as an officer or director of any public
company, and subject him to large civil fines.23
This was not the SEC’s first effort to suppress an automotive
genius. Shortly after World War II, an SEC investigation led to the
indictment of Preston Tucker, a flamboyant figure who was then
building an ultra-modernistic automobile with advanced safety feat–
ures.24 Tucker sold stock to the public to fund this venture, but he ran
21.

See id. There is some speculation that Musk’s tweet was actually a
marijuana-related joke; if so, it was a bad one. See, e.g., Ian Spiegelman,
Elon Musk May Have Ruined Twitter for All Puckish Billionaire CEOs,
L.A. Mag. (June 14, 2019), https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/elonmusk-sec-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/P5FV-A8KS] (speculating that Musk’s
tweet about “taking Tesla private at $420” was a joke, but that, “[o]f
course, the stiffs at the SEC didn’t get that ‘420’ was a joke about smoking
weed”). Musk’s tweet stated that: “Am considering taking Tesla private
at $420. Funding secured.” Id.

22.

Elon Musk Charged with Securities Fraud for Misleading Tweets, supra
note 20.

23.

Id. The SEC’s action had even broader ramifications because it was “likely
to send shock waves across corporate America and could lead to a reevaluation of how companies use Twitter to communicate with the
investing public.” Goldstein & Flitter, supra note 14.

24.

See Abigail Tucker, The Tucker Was the 1940s Car of the Future,
Smithsonian Mag. (Dec. 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
history/the-tucker-was-the-1940s-car-of-the-future-135008742/ [https://
perma.cc/N6M8-XNGA]. The so-called “Tucker Torpedo” promoted what
were then revolutionary safety innovations such as a protective windshield,
padded dashboards, and seat belts; see also William Faloon, Inventor of
Safer Automobile, Life Extension Mag. (Aug. 2006), https://www.
lifeextension.com/magazine/2006/8/awsi/page-01?p=1 [https://perma.cc/
5K56-4KTB]; Alex A., Find of the Year? 1946 Tucker Torpedo prototype
II hides a secret Riviera, The Vintage News (June 10, 2016),
https://www.thevintagenews.com/2016/06/10/find-of-the-year-1946-tuckertorpedo-prototype-ii-hides-a-secret-riviera-ii-hides-a-secret-riviera-2-2/
[https://perma.cc/LNX4-8TDH] (describing additional safety features of
the Tucker Torpedo).
Musk and Tesla are also advocates of automotive safety as demonstrated
by Tesla’s exemplary crash ratings and its efforts to introduce autonomous
cars as a means of reducing driver errors. See Tesla Safety Report, Tesla,
https://www.tesla.com/VehicleSafetyReport [https://perma.cc/UKA3RWGG] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); Robert Ferris, Tesla Model 3 Earns
Perfect 5-Star NHTSA Safety Rating, CNBC (Sept. 20, 2018, 12:41 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/20/tesla-model-3-earns-perfect-5-starnhtsa-safety-rating.html [https://perma.cc/VV2R-64BU]. Unsurprisingly,
Musk’s and Tesla’s Internet blog boasts about the safety of Tesla’s
vehicles led to a brouhaha with another government agency: the U.S.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). See Ryan
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afoul of the SEC. The SEC claimed that Tucker was incapable of
producing any actual cars, which resulted in the Justice Department
indicting Tucker and several of his executives.25 After a lengthy trial,
the defendants were acquitted of all charges.26 As portrayed in a popular
movie, however, the government’s action destroyed the company, which
was able to produce only fifty-one cars before its failure.27
Musk proved to be a wilier target. Initially, he vowed to contest
the SEC’s charges, contending that the agency was interfering with his
First Amendment rights.28 But calmer heads prevailed. Removing Musk
from Tesla’s management posed a serious threat to the company’s
survival and likely would have evaporated billions of dollars in

Browne, Tesla Received a Cease-and-Desist Letter From US Agency Over
Model 3 Safety Claims, CNBC (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/08/07/tesla-scrutinized-by-the-nhsta-over-model-3-safetyclaims.html [https://perma.cc/PCZ8-88ET]. The NHTSA ordered Tesla
to cease and desist from misleadingly claiming that Tesla’s NHTSA safety
ratings established that Tesla drivers had the lowest probability of being
injured in an automobile crash. See id. Tesla rejected the agency’s request,
contending that the NHTSA’s ratings did prove Tesla’s safety claims. Id.
The NHTSA then referred the matter to the Federal Trade Commission
for a consumer fraud investigation. Id.
25.

Keith Barry, Jan. 22, 1950: Jury Acquits Tucker of Fraud, Wired (Jan.
22, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2010/01/0122prestontucker-acquitted/ [https://perma.cc/7WMV-BZGS]. The U.S. Attorney
prosecuting this case was Otto Kerner, Jr. See James Warren et al.,
Tucker’s Film Trial Torpedoes Reality, Chi. Trib. (Oct. 4, 1988),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1988-10-04-8802040657story.html [https://perma.cc/27D6-3NB9]. Kerner later became the
Governor of Illinois, a federal judge on the Seventh Circuit, and an inmate
in a federal prison after he was convicted on corruption and stock-fraud
charges. Seth S. King, Ex-Gov. Otto Kerner Dies; Convicted While a
Judge, N.Y. Times (May 10, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/05/
10/archives/exgov-otto-kerner-dies-convicted-while-a-judge.html [https://
perma.cc/54JM-EFDA].

26.

See Peter Liebhold, Preston Tucker’s Sedan: Showcasing a Beautiful
Business Failure, Nat’l Museum of Am. Hist.: Stories from the
Museum (Aug. 10, 2016), https://americanhistory.si.edu/blog/prestontuckers-sedan-showcasing-beautiful-business-failure [https://perma.cc/
X3XH-HXCN].

27.

See Tucker: The Man and His Dream (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1988); see also
Warren et al., supra note 25 (describing the film and the company’s
automobile-production numbers).

28.

Chris Isidore & Jethro Mullen, Elon Musk Says the SEC is Trying To
Trample on His Freedom of Speech, CNN Bus. (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/11/tech/elon-musk-deadline-sec/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZGD-V8CV].
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shareholder value.29 Instead, Musk and Tesla settled with the SEC.30 In
exchange for allowing him to continue as Tesla’s CEO, Musk forfeited
his First Amendment rights by agreeing to submit his tweets to an
undefined oversight process at Tesla that would ensure the tweets
conformed to SEC speech mandates before their publication.31
Musk was unrepentant after settling the SEC charges, as reflected
in a tweet in which he derided the SEC for failing to protect Tesla
shareholders from attacks by short-sellers.32 Musk sarcastically asserted
that the SEC’s acronym actually stands for the “Shortseller Enrichment
Commission” and that it was “doing incredible work” in aiding those
traders.33 Musk also revealed on national television that no one at Tesla
29.

See Irina Ivanova, SEC Fraud Suit Against Elon Musk Threatens to
Unravel Tesla, CBS News (Sept. 28, 2018, 6:38 PM), https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/secs-fraud-suit-against-elon-musk-threatens-to-unravel-tesla/
[https://perma.cc/T6G9-33RA] (describing “investor uncertainty over
Musk's future at the company” and Tesla’s $20 billion loss in market
value since Musk’s August 2018 tweet).

30.

Elon Musk Settles SEC Fraud Charge; Tesla Charged With and Resolves
Securities Law Charge, SEC (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2018-226 [https://perma.cc/93Z6-TEVJ].

31.

Id. Musk and Tesla each agreed to pay a $20 million fine, which were to
be distributed to shareholders purportedly harmed by Musk’s tweet. Musk
also agreed to resign from his position as chairman of the Tesla board. Id.

32.

See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning,
136 S. Ct. 1562, 1566 (2015) (describing short-sale transactions). Short
sellers arouse the ire of Musk because they benefit from stock-price
declines that result from, among other things, publication of criticism and
bad news about a public company. See Lawrence Delevingne, Short &
Distort? The Ugly War Between CEOs and Activist Critics, Reuters
(Mar. 21, 2019, 1:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usastocks-shorts-insight/short-distort-the-ugly-war-between-ceos-and-activistcritics-idUSKCN1R20AW [https://perma.cc/T8CR-NMLT]. Through his
tweets, Musk tried to counter short-sellers of Tesla stock and his critics
in the mainstream media and elsewhere, but he is now muzzled from doing
so by the SEC injunction. See David Ingram, Elon Musk Taunts SEC as
‘Shortseller Enrichment Commission’, NBC News (Oct. 4, 2018, 4:36
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/elon-musk-taunts-secshortseller-enrichment-commission-n916816 [https://perma.cc/N7BJ-Y9L6].
But see Bill Alpert, Tesla CEO Elon Musk is Wrong About Short Sellers,
Barron’s (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-elonmusk-is-wrong-about-short-sellers-1539384687 [https://perma.cc/U45WDPBN] (describing the economic role of short sellers); Jerry W.
Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Broker-Dealer Operations Under
Securities and Commodities Laws §§ 9:7, .50, Westlaw (updated Nov.
2018) (describing criticism of the SEC’s prior efforts to curb short selling
and the adverse market effects of those efforts).

33.

Tim Higgins & Gabriel T. Rubin, Elon Musk Tweet Mocks the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Wall St. J. (Oct. 4, 2018, 11:50 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-tweet-appears-to-mock-thesecurities-and-exchange-commission-1538685320 [https://perma.cc/
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was reviewing his tweets, stating: “I want to be clear. I do not respect
the SEC.”34
Less than six months after its initial complaint, the SEC initiated
a contempt order against Musk.35 The subject of the contempt pro–
ceeding was a Musk tweet, which stated that Tesla would make around
500,000 cars in 2019.36 This was an increase of 100,000 cars over an
earlier projection by the company.37 Musk corrected that tweet a few
hours later by stating that Tesla would deliver 400,000 cars in 2019,
but that it would be producing at a rate of 500,000 cars per year at
year-end.38 Nonetheless, the SEC sought a contempt citation because
Musk’s tweets had not received prior approval from Tesla, a step the
SEC claimed was required by the prior settlement agreement.39 Within
one day Musk tweeted that the SEC’s action against him had harmed
Tesla shareholders by pushing Tesla’s stock price down, and he charged
that “[s]omething is broken with SEC oversight.”40 He further argued
V3B7-4MNT].
34.

Alan Ohnsman, Judge Says SEC Can Have a Crack at Statements by Elon
Musk’s Lawyers, Forbes (Mar. 12, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/alanohnsman/2019/03/12/judge-oks-sec-request-to-respond-to-musklawyers-assertions-in-tesla-case-or/#47be26ad74ad [https://perma.cc/
AWA8-ULY8].

35.

See Russ Mitchell, Elon Musk Keeps Slamming the SEC on Twitter. He
has 2 Weeks to Respond in Court, L.A. Times (Feb. 26, 2019, 5:50 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hy-elon-musk-sec-20190226story.html [https://perma.cc/BDX2-A7EK].

36.

Id.

37.

Neal Boudette, S.E.C. Asks Court to Hold Tesla’s Elon Musk in Contempt
for Twitter Post on Production, N.Y. Times (Feb. 25, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/business/elon-musk-contempt-tweet-sectesla.html [https://perma.cc/4VTE-YF9A].

38.

Id.; see also Alexandria Sage, SEC Seeks Contempt Charge Against
Tesla’s Musk, Says Tweet Violates Deal, Reuters (Feb. 25, 2019, 6:31
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-musk-sec/sec-seeks-contemptcharge-against-teslas-musk-says-tweet-violates-deal-idUSKCN1QE2OR
[https://perma.cc/CNK5-MGTS].

39.

SEC’s Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of an Order to Show
Cause at 1–2, SEC v. Musk, No. 1:18-cv-8865-AJN-GWG (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 2019), ECF No. 18; see also Elon Musk Never Sought Approval for a
Single Tesla Tweet, U.S. SEC Tells Judge, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2019, 8:25
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-musk-sec/elon-musk-neversought-approval-for-a-single-tesla-tweet-u-s-sec-tells-judge-idUSKCN1R001J
[https://perma.cc/GS46-YANP].

40.

Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter (Feb. 26, 2019, 7:35 AM), https://
twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1100371207491248128 [https://perma.cc/
FHL7-89WP]; see also Robert Ferris, Elon Musk Lashes Out: “Something
is Broken With SEC Oversight”, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019, 8:59 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/26/elon-musk-lashes-out-something-is-
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that the First Amendment protected his tweets and that the company
had already publicly announced the substance of his message.41
The judge hearing the SEC contempt motion ordered the parties to
seek a settlement.42 A law school professor then publicly advocated
imposing more explicit and defined prior restraints on Musk’s speech,
i.e., that Musk’s tweets, before their dissemination, be reviewed by an
attorney versed in SEC censorship requirements who would act as the
SEC’s “baby sitter” for Musk.43 That was the course the parties took
through an amended settlement agreement in which Musk agreed to
submit his tweets for review and prior approval by an “experienced

broken-with-sec-oversight.html [https://perma.cc/2GVU-XMKA] (describing
the timing of Musk’s tweet and his view that the SEC harmed Tesla
shareholders); Mitchell, supra note 35. Despite his criticism of the SEC,
Musk is conflicted over whether SEC regulation bestows a benefit. On the
one hand, he advised SpaceX employees that cashing in their stock and
option grants through a public offering was a bad idea because of SEC
regulations and market flaws. See Vance, supra note 7, at 259–60. On
the other hand, Musk claimed that Tesla was different from SpaceX
because Tesla was forced to go to the public market in order to raise
much-needed capital. See id. at 290. This ambivalence surfaced again after
the conclusion of the SEC’s contempt proceedings against Musk, and after
Tesla reported a large quarterly loss. Tesla then made a successful public
offering of stock and bonds totaling $2.3 billion. Sam Goldfarb & Allison
Prang, Tesla Completes $2.35 billion Stock and Bond Sale, Wall St. J.
(May 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-seeks-raise-as-much-as2-7-billion-up-from-2-3-billion-11556886130 [https://perma.cc/9VS7-VZBC].
41.

Response to Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Elon Musk Should Not
be held in Contempt for Violating the Court’s Final Judgment at 3, SEC
v. Musk, No. 1:18-cv-8865-AJN-GWG (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2019), ECF No.
27. Musk’s lawyers argued in the SEC contempt proceeding that the
injunction against Musk was an impermissible prior restraint that violated
the First Amendment. Id. at 21–25. The SEC contended that Musk
waived his First Amendment rights when he agreed to the court’s
injunction, a claim that was rebutted by Musk’s lawyers. Id. at 20; see
also SEC’s Reply Memorandum to Defendant Elon Musk’s Response to
Order to Show Cause at 12, SEC v. Musk, No. 1:18-cv-8865-AJN-GWG
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019), ECF No. 30. The court did not resolve this
issue because the parties agreed on a settlement of the contempt issue.
See infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (describing the settlement).

42.

The judge ordered the parties to “put their reasonableness pants on” to
reach a compromise. See Dave Michaels & Tim Higgins, Judge Gives Elon
Musk, SEC Two Weeks to Strike Deal on Contempt Claims, Wall St.
J. (Apr. 4, 2019, 7:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-asks-elonmusk-and-sec-to-hold-talks-over-contempt-claims-11554408620 [https://
perma.cc/W2D9-HNA9].

43.

John C. Coffee, Jr., How the SEC Can Be the Babysitter Elon Musk Needs,
CNN Bus. (Apr. 23, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/23/
perspectives/tesla-elon-musk-sec/index.html [https://perma.cc/5FHZ2VSL].

348

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Securities & Exchange Commission vs. Elon Musk & the First Amendment

securities lawyer,”44 who was quickly given the derisive sobriquet of
“Twitter sitter.”45
This settlement was considered to be another victory for Musk
because he was allowed to continue in his role as Tesla’s CEO and no
further sanctions were ordered.46 Nevertheless, it was a loss for First
Amendment–protected speech. Anyone dealing with corporate lawyers
on SEC disclosure issues knows that such review is a time-consuming
process that can take days or even weeks. Rather than submit to that
ordeal, and as a direct result of the SEC injunction, Musk self-censored
the volume and content of his tweets.47 As his attorneys advised the
court during the SEC contempt proceeding, Musk was tweeting half as
often as he did before the SEC injunction.48

44.

Dave Michaels, Judge Approves Deal Spelling Out Oversight of Elon
Musk’s Tweets, Wall St. J. (Apr. 30, 2019, 9:04 PM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/judge-approves-deal-spelling-out-oversight-of-elon-muskstweets-11556669333 [https://perma.cc/F65X-MVQR]. The long laundry
list of topics subject to this prior restraint included financial information
about the company, new products, sales numbers, and production figures.
Dave Michaels & Tim Higgins, Musk, SEC Reach Deal to End Court Fight
Overt Tesla CEO’s Tweets, Wall St. J. (Apr. 26, 2019, 6:33 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-sec-propose-deal-to-end-latestcourt-fight-over-tesla-ceos-tweets-11556314495 [https://perma.cc/4GPF4TE8]; Dana Hull & Benjamin Bain, Elon Musk’s Mystery Twitter Sitter
Has One Wild and Crazy Job, Bloomberg (Feb. 26, 2019, 3:35 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-26/elon-musk-s-mysterytwitter-sitter-has-one-wild-and-crazy-job [https://perma.cc/5PNH-CJM2].

45.

Hull & Bain, supra note 44.

46.

Bob Van Voris & Dana Hull, Musk, SEC Settle Legal Fight Over His
Tweets About Tesla, Bloomberg (Apr. 27, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-26/musk-sec-settle-legalfight-over-his-tweets-about-tesla-juykzbwq [https://perma.cc/3KJU-RR5T].

47.

See infra note 48 and accompanying text.

48.

See Drew Harwell, Elon Musk’s Defense of his Tesla Tweets ‘Borders on
the Ridiculous,’ Says SEC, Wash. Post (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:56 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/19/elon-musksdefense-his-tesla-tweets-is-flawed-sec-says/?utm_term=.63a52de720cd.
[https://perma.cc/HXG5-F7ZL]. Further illustrating the effects of the
SEC injunction is the advice given to Musk by Mark Cuban, the brash
and outspoken owner of the Dallas Mavericks who successfully fought SEC
charges of insider trading. Despite that victory, Cuban advised that, in
order to avoid further SEC retaliation, Musk had to “try to bite [his]
tongue no matter how hard it is, because [the SEC] do[es]n’t care.” Aarthi
Swaminathan, Mark Cuban Told Elon Musk to ‘Bite Your Tongue’ in
Dealings with SEC, Yahoo Finance (May 29, 2019), https://finance
.yahoo.com/news/mark-cuban-elon-musk-sec-200719978.html [https://
perma.cc/VWD7-Y5R9]. Cuban added, “[W]hen you’ve got a bunch of
bureaucrats trying to come at you in a world where there aren’t bright
line guidelines, that’s tough.” Id.
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II. The First Amendment and “Commercial Speech”
The First Amendment allows citizens to advocate controversial
changes in society without submitting to government censorship or
control.49 Its purpose is “to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail.”50 In that marketplace, even false
statements count as protected speech.51 As a means of reaching the
truth, protecting one’s freedom to make false statements may, at first,
seem incongruous. As the United States Supreme Court recognized,
however, in United States v. Alvarez, “some false statements are
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in
public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks
to guarantee.”52 The Court further opined: “The remedy for speech that
is false speech is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a
free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the
uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”53
The First Amendment bans prior restraints on protected speech,
including court-ordered injunctions.54 Government actions inducing selfcensorship of protected speech are also prohibited.55 “Whenever an
individual . . . engages in self-censorship, the values of the First Am–
49.

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).

50.

FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)
(quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).

51.

See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012).

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 727.

54.

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 701, 713–19 (1931)
(newspapers containing “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” articles
could not be enjoined from publication). The Second Circuit has noted:
A “prior restraint” on speech is a law, regulation or judicial order
that suppresses speech—or provides for its suppression at the
discretion of government officials—on the basis of the speech’s
content and in advance of its actual expression. It has long been
established that such restraints constitute “the most serious and
the least tolerable infringement” on our freedoms of speech and
press. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the elimination of
prior restraints as the “chief purpose” of the First Amendment.
Any imposition of a prior restraint, therefore, bears “a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.” . . . A prior
restraint is not constitutionally inoffensive merely because it is
temporary.
United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).

55.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (describing the
dangers of government-induced self-censorship).
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endment are compromised, because the public is denied information or
ideas.”56 First Amendment jurisprudence is “designed to prevent selfcensorship premised on fear of governmental sanctions against ex–
pression.”57
The First Amendment additionally protects against speech com–
pelled by the government.58 That is, “the First Amendment guarantees
‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of both
what to say and what not to say.”59 This includes such things as
requiring students to stand and salute the flag60 and compulsory union
dues used for purposes that government employees do not support.61
The Supreme Court has further held that requiring the baking of a cake
for a same-sex wedding may violate the cakemaker’s First Amendment–
protected religious beliefs.62
Of course, the First Amendment’s right of free speech is not
unlimited in scope. The Constitution does not protect those who falsely
shout “fire” in a crowded theatre,63 or those whose speech presents a
clear and present danger of inciting unlawful activities.64 Nevertheless,
56.

Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 13 (2012).

57.

Id.

58.

See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2464 (2018) (“[M]ost of our free speech cases have involved restrictions on
what can be said, rather than laws compelling speech. But measures
compelling speech are at least as threatening.”).

59.

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988)
(requiring disclosures by charitable fundraisers regarding how the donated
funds were used violated First Amendment); see also Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980)
(invalidating on First Amendment grounds an ordinance restricting the
type of persons that could solicit charitable contributions).

60.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

61.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.

62.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1723–24 (2018).

63.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

64.

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (First Amendment
protects advocacy of the use of force or a violation of the law, “except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (rejecting the argument that
the “constitutional freedom of speech . . . extends its immunity to speech
or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute”). But see N.Y. Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (the classification as secret of a Defense Department’s Vietnam
War study did not justify a prior-restraint injunction against its publication
by the press).

351

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Securities & Exchange Commission vs. Elon Musk & the First Amendment

government regulations that affect speech’s contents or viewpoints are
subject to “strict” scrutiny by the courts.65 This means, among other
things, that a statute that regulates speech based on content “must be
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a
less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative.”66
Difficult and complex delineations are drawn between protected
and unprotected speech. For example, libel and slander proceedings
may be brought where private individuals are the subjects of false
statements.67 In contrast, damages may be awarded only under limited
circumstances where the target of a false statement is a public figure.68
The government may also impose reasonable, but “very limited,”
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech in public for–
ums.69 Such restrictions, however, must be “justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”70
The government may require a license where a benefit is bestowed,
but it cannot deny a license on grounds that are “viewpoint” based.71
Viewpoint discrimination “is an ‘egregious form of content discrim–
ination’ and is ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’”72 Viewpoint protec–
tion, for example, precludes the denial of a trademark license for marks
that “disparage” any person, “living or dead.”73 The government also
cannot deny a trademark for matters that are “immoral or “scandal–

65.

See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813–14 (2000).

66.

Id. at 813.

67.

See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).

68.

See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).

69.

McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014).

70.

Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)); see
also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983)
(invalidating Postal Service regulations that prohibited mailing unsolicited
advertisements for contraceptives); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
451 (1938) (holding as unconstitutional an ordinance that required a
permit to distribute literature).

71.

See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019).

72.

Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829–30 (1995)).

73.

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)).
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ous.”74 Moreover, it is a “bedrock” First Amendment principle that the
government cannot deny a license to “ideas that offend.”75
The so-called commercial-speech doctrine has historically been the
broadest exception to the application of full First Amendment speech
protections. For example, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,76 the Supreme
Court stated that, although the First Amendment protects political
speech from government regulation, it is “equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.”77 The Supreme Court has defined
commercial speech as a communication that “does no more than
propose a commercial transaction”78 and is “related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”79
The Supreme Court’s harsh view of the value of commercial speech
has leavened over time. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,80 the Court recognized that
a “consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial inform–
ation . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day’s most urgent political debate.”81 Society “may have a strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information. Even an individual
advertisement, though entirely ‘commercial,’ may be of general public

74.

Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2302.

75.

Id. at 2299 (quoting Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751).

76.

316 U.S. 52 (1942).

77.

Id. at 54.

78.

United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).

79.

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).

80.

425 U.S. 748 (1976).

81.

Id. at 763.
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interest.”82 Among other things, this meant that advertising retail
alcohol beverage prices could not be banned.83
In Sorrell v. IMS Health,84 the Supreme Court gave First
Amendment protection to commercial information-gathering activities.
The Court noted that “[w]hile the burdened speech results from an
economic motive, so too does a great deal of vital expression.”85 This
means that professionals licensed by a state cannot be required to make
compelled speech disclosures to consumers, absent a strong reason.86
The First Amendment also protects corporations when they are
carrying out political activities even if those acts are commercial in
nature.87
Compounding the analysis of the commercial-speech exception is
the fact that such speech may be mixed with political speech that would
otherwise receive full First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court
has asserted that, in such cases, it does not believe that “speech retains

82.

Id. at 764–65. The Court further observed that:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765. The Court noted that First Amendment protection has been
given to commercial speech concerning such things as advertisements for
abortion referrals; claims that a manufacturer’s sale of artificial fur was a
desirable alternative to the killing of animals; and claims that consumers
should prefer a domestic producer because it provided American jobs. Id.
at 764 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Fur Info. &
Fashion Council, Inc., v. E.F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Chi. Joint Bd., AFL-CIO v. Chi. Trib. Co., 435 F.2d
470 (1970)).

83.

Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).

84.

564 U.S. 552 (2011).

85.

Id. at 567.

86.

Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375
(2018) (state could not mandate “professional” speech dealing with
abortion services).

87.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2009)
(protecting under the First Amendment a video political advertisement
critical of presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton).
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its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with
otherwise fully protected speech.”88
Still, the Supreme Court continues to recognize a commercial
speech exception. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,89 the Court
observed that it had not discarded the “‘common-sense’ distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction . . . and other
varieties of speech.”90 This commercial-speech exception has allowed
“modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.”91 The Court stated that it could cite
“[n]umerous examples . . . of communications that are regulated
without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of
information about securities, [and] corporate proxy statements,” which
are regulated by the SEC.92
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,93 the Supreme Court held that, although it “rejected the
‘highly paternalistic’ view that government has complete power to
suppress or regulate commercial speech,”94 the Constitution “accords a
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression. The protection available for particular commer–
cial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the
governmental interests served by its regulation.”95 Misleading commer–
cial speech will not receive First Amendment protection. That is, “the
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive
the public than to inform it.”96
88.

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1998);
see also Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)
(stating that courts must consider whether speech is both commercial and
noncommercial).

89.

436 U.S. 447 (1978).

90.

Id. at 455–56.

91.

Id. at 456; see also State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477.

92.

Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56; see also Ibanez v. Fla. Bd. of Accountancy,
512 U.S. 136 (1994) (describing limitations on governmental restrictions
on advertising by professionals); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (rejecting a blanket prohibition of attorneys’ advertising speech).

93.

447 U.S. 557 (1980).

94.

Id. at 562. The Court further stated: “Commercial expression not only
serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and
furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information.” Id. at 561–62.

95.

Id. at 563.

96.

Id.; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
(analyzing commercial tobacco advertising restrictions in light of the First
Amendment).

355

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Securities & Exchange Commission vs. Elon Musk & the First Amendment

The Central Hudson opinion set forth a four-part test to govern the
First Amendment’s application to commercial speech: (1) protected
commercial speech must involve lawful activity and not be misleading;
(2) the government must have a “substantial” interest in regulating the
speech; (3) the regulation must “directly advance[]” that interest; and
(4) the government’s regulation must not be broader than necessary to
carry out its interest97 (e.g., government mandated warnings or
disclaimers are a preferable alternative to the suppression of speech).98
In applying that test in Edenfield v. Fane,99 the Supreme Court
noted that:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and
cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information
flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented. Thus, even a communication that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of
the First Amendment.100

Nevertheless, the Court in Edenfield stated that “our cases make
clear that the State may ban commercial expression that is fraudulent
or deceptive without further justification.”101

III. The SEC and the First Amendment
A.

The Core Mission of the SEC is to Compel and Censor Commercial
Speech

The SEC’s compelled-speech and licensing requirements seek to
protect investors from false or deceptive information102 and to allow

97.

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

98.

Id. at 565; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 319 (2009) (“The Government may regulate corporate political
speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not
suppress that speech altogether.”).

99.

507 U.S. 761 (1993).

100. Id. at 767.
101. Id. at 768–69.
102. The SEC has stated that a principal purpose of the federal securities laws
is to assure that companies publicly selling securities “must tell the public
the truth about their businesses, the securities they are selling, and the
risks involved in investing. What We Do, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n,
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/49465MRW] (last modified June 10, 2013).
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them to make informed investment decisions.103 In carrying out that
mission, the federal securities laws impose licensing requirements and
compulsory speech mandates on public companies104 by requiring those
companies to publish information about their finances and operations.105
The SEC, in various ways, also censors the speech of executives at
public companies.106
Both the federal securities laws and SEC regulations require the
disclosure of “material” facts about a public company that a reasonable
investor would want to consider in making an investment decision.107
These disclosure requirements are implemented through detailed SEC

103. Id. (“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United
States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors,
whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to
certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as
they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public. This
provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for
themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only
through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information
can people make sound investment decisions.”).
104. The licensing requirements for public companies are found in the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f–77g (2012), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
105. See infra Part III.G–K. The SEC’s speech censorship is premised on the
theory that its licensing and speech mandates bestow a benefit because
they “facilitate capital formation.” See About the SEC, Secs. & Exch.
Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last modified Nov. 22, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/7FBP-E32D]. But there is some question as to whether
those regulations fulfill that mission. See Frank Holmes, The Public Pool
of Publicly Traded Stocks is Shrinking. Here’s What Investors Can Do,
Forbes (Aug. 13, 2018, 12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
greatspeculations/2018/08/13/the-pool-of-publicly-traded-stocks-is-shrinkingheres-what-investors-can-do/#39bab8042078 [https://perma.cc/U5PCXMA5] (“[T]he number of publicly listed companies in the U.S. has fallen
steadily since 1997. More companies have delisted, in fact, than gone
public in every year of the past 20 years except one, 2013.”).
106. See infra Part III.F.
107. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988); TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 440 (1976); Matrixx Initiatives v.
Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37 (2011).
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regulations and forms, such as forms SK,108 10-K,109 10-Q,110 and 8-K.111
Those forms require a company to make financial disclosures before it
can be registered (licensed) by the SEC and the company must update
those disclosures on a quarterly and annual basis and when unusual
events occur.112 The SEC’s disclosure requirements and sanctions are
ever-expanding, increasingly onerous, and have led to severe civil and
criminal prosecutions that resulted in injunctions restricting speech,
long prison terms, large fines, and lifetime employment debarments.113
The following subsections of this Article describe some areas of SEC
regulation that raise First Amendment concerns in the application of
the commercial-speech exception. Although jurisprudence on this
subject is surprisingly limited, there is case law that provides guidance
on the limits of SEC censorship regarding some speech content.114 In
other areas, the application of the commercial-speech exception remains
uncertain.
B. SEC Licensing Requirements and the Financial Press

In Lowe v. SEC,115 the defendants were charged with publishing an
investment advisory newsletter without being licensed under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.116 This action, which would have
otherwise been a fundamental abridgement of free speech, was brought
by the SEC under the guise of regulating “potentially deceptive
108. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2019).
109. Form 10-K, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/
form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK5J-TTKS] (last updated May 2019).
110. Form 10-Q, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/files/form10q.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7WP-AQWJ] (last updated May 2019).
111. Form 8-K, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/files/form8k.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4EH-SQL4] (last updated May 2019).
112. Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n,
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting
(last modified Oct. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/GJ9H-6EZG]. The
completion of these forms requires thousands of hours of work by company
employees, accountants, and lawyers. For example, the SEC estimates
that it takes on average some 2,400 hours of work to complete an annual
report on Form 10-K. See Form 10-K, supra note 109.
113. See generally Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern
U.S. Corporate Scandals from Enron to Reform (2006) (describing
the SEC’s expansion of its enforcement role and increased punishments
for offenders).
114. See Karl M. F. Lockhart, A ‘Corporate Democracy’?: Freedom of Speech
and the SEC, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1593, 1624–27 (2018) (describing application
of the First Amendment to SEC regulations).
115. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
116. Id. at 183; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (2012).
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commercial speech.”117 The Supreme Court was able to avoid giving a
direct answer to the question of whether the defendants were actually
publishing protected First Amendment speech. Instead, the Court held
that the defendants fell within a registration exemption in the Invest–
ment Advisers Act, which was applicable to “the publisher of any bona
fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of
general and regular circulation.”118
In justifying a broad application of that exemption, the Court
pointed to its previous decision in Lovell v. City of Griffin,119 where it
held that prior restraints and licensing requirements for the exercise of
speech “strike[] at the very foundation of the freedom of the press.”120
The Court then noted that Congress explicitly considered its Lovell
decision when passing the Investment Advisers Act. Apropos of Elon
Musk’s tweets, the Court also concluded that, when enacting that Act,
Congress was specifically concerned with fraud and deception in the
context of “personalized communications.”121 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, Congress did not intend to regulate publications generally
sold to the public containing factual information and market comment–
ary.122

117. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 187 (quoting SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 901 (2d Cir.
1984)).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (2012). The SEC brought a number of similar
cases against unregistered investment advisory newsletters while it was
prosecuting the defendants in Lowe. See Stacy P. Thompson, Lowe v.
SEC: Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Clashes with First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 21 U. Rich. L. Rev. 201, 216 n.68
(1986). The author was defense counsel in one such case: SEC v. Financial
News Associates, No. 84-0878-A, 1985 WL 25023 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26,
1985), vacated, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20386 (June 21, 1985). See also
Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, News Digest, May 3, 1985, at 1, available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1985/dig050385.pdf [https://perma.cc/
23Z8-GRUL]. There, the SEC alleged that an unregistered newsletter was
a complete scam because it falsely claimed that former officials in
government intelligence organizations, such as the CIA in the U.S. and
the Mossad in Israel, generated its investment advice. Fin. News Assocs.,
1985 WL 25023, at *1–5. After a trial, the district court ruled against the
defendants and entered injunctions. Id. at *14. Following the Lowe
decision, the district court withdrew its decision, and injunctions were
lifted, including one entered by consent before the trial. See SEC v. Fin.
News Assocs., No. 84-0878-A, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20386, at *1 (E.D.
Va. June 21, 1985).
119. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
120. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 205 (quoting Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
121. Id. at 210.
122. Id.

359

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Securities & Exchange Commission vs. Elon Musk & the First Amendment
C.

Effect of Disclaimers on SEC Censorship Requirements

As described in Part II of this Article, the Supreme Court has
directed that disclaimers and warnings are the preferred means of
regulating commercial speech in lieu of its suppression. Courts have
considered the relation of disclaimers to both the SEC’s commercialspeech regulation and its antifraud rules, albeit not with the First
Amendment in mind.123 Public companies and their executives are often
called upon to give their projections of their company’s future perform–
ance. An example of such a projection is the one Musk made on Twitter
regarding Tesla’s delivery and production goals, the same tweets that
were the subject of the SEC contempt proceeding.124
In In re Donald J. Trump Securities Litigation,125 the United States
Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that several federal courts had
dismissed securities law–fraud claims concerning projections on the
grounds of a “bespeaks caution” doctrine.126 This doctrine posits that
cautionary language in offering documents can negate the materiality
of an omission or misrepresentation.127 There were several such warnings
in the offering materials in Trump with respect to the company’s
revenue projections from its casino operations.128 The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 later codified this exemption into the
federal securities laws.129
D.

SEC Speech Restrictions Negated by Public Debate

Another case demonstrating how SEC disclosure requirements may,
unintentionally, interplay with the First Amendment involved Apple
Computer, Inc. and its CEO, Steve Jobs.130 Jobs was the subject of a
123. Id. at 225.
124. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing those tweets).
125. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
126. Id. at 371.
127. Id. at 364.
128. The Court in Trump Securities stated that, “as a general matter”:
[W]hen an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections
are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the
forward-looking statements will not form the basis for a securities
fraud claim if those statements did not affect the “total mix” of
information the document provided investors. In other words,
cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or
misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.
Id. at 371. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak
Caution”, 49 Bus. L. Rev. 481 (1993) (describing this doctrine).
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2012).
130. In re Apple Comput. Secs. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989).
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best-selling biography131 and movie about his deviousness, lack of
human empathy, ingenuity, quirks, and tenacity,132 all of which rivaled
or exceeded those qualities in Elon Musk. Like Musk, Jobs was a
controversial, idiosyncratic, inventive, and transformative genius whose
every pronouncement was closely followed in the press.133
One of Apple’s innovations was a business-oriented computer
named “Lisa” and that computer’s disk drive, called “Twiggy.”134 A
class action suit filed against Jobs and other Apple executives charged
that they committed fraud under the federal securities laws by overoptimistically touting the potential sales of Lisa and Twiggy and by
failing to disclose operational problems.135 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that, while the defendants had
failed to disclose material facts concerning Lisa and Twiggy, “[a]t least
twenty articles stressed the risks Apple was taking, and detailed the
underlying problems producing those risks.”136 The Court held that “the
defendant’s failure to disclose material information may be excused
where that information has been made credibly available to the market
by other sources.”137
E.

SEC Mandated Self-Censorship Through Monitoring Requirements

The SEC placed prior restraints that are similar to those imposed
on Musk on the speech of financial analysts during the Enron-era
scandals.138 Those analysts were supposedly independent of their firms’
investment banking operations, but they actually acted as shills for
131. Walter Isaacson, Steve Jobs (2011).
132. Steve Jobs (Legendary Pictures 2015), available at https://www.amazon
.com/Steve-Jobs-Michael-Fassbender/dp/B016C9WS84/ref=sr_1_1?
keywords=Steve+Jobs+movie&qid=1569954908&sr=8-1 [https://perma.cc/
MKZ3-D79G].
133. See Jeff Bercovici, A Look Back at How the Media Covered the Death of
Steve Jobs, Forbes (Oct. 4, 2012, 8:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jeffbercovici/2012/10/04/a-look-back-at-how-the-media-coveredthe-death-of-steve-jobs/#57874985438a [https://perma.cc/V3R3-RD3H].
134. Apple Securities, 886 F.2d at 1111.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1116. The Ninth Circuit did find a material issue of fact as to
whether certain statements by defendants concerning Twiggy’s technical
problems were negated by critical press coverage. Id. at 1118. On remand,
a jury exonerated Steve Jobs and Apple but assessed damages of some
$100 million against two other Apple executives. The trial judge set that
damage award aside as being inconsistent and unsupported by substantial
evidence. Multimillion Dollar Fraud Verdict Set Aside in Apple Computer
Litigation, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1320 (BNA Sept. 13, 1991).
137. 886 F.2d at 1115.
138. Markham, supra note 113, at 405–21.
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stocks being underwritten by their investment banker colleagues. Those
analysts publicly touted stocks they were following as being good
investments while internally disparaging their investment quality.139
The SEC and other regulators entered into a $1.4 billion settlement
with several of the world’s largest investment banks over these
practices.140 Among other things, the analysts were required to have a
lawyer “chaperone” present to monitor conversations whenever analysts
met or spoke privately with investment bankers in their firm.141
F.

SEC Regulation of Speech through Demeanor and Facial
Expressions

The SEC’s overreaching in imposing speech restraints is further
exhibited in its Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure).142 Some background is
needed to put that regulation into context. In Dirks v. SEC,143 the SEC
charged an investment adviser with insider trading fraud. The basis for
the claim was that the adviser sold the stock of one of his clients’
portfolio companies after being privately alerted by an official of that
company that it was carrying out a massive fraud.144 The Supreme
Court rejected the SEC’s claim, holding that the adviser owed no duty
to publicly disclose that information before liquidating customer
positions.145 The SEC did not accede gracefully to the Dirks decision.
Instead, it adopted Regulation FD, which prohibits executives from
making selective disclosures of nonpublic company information to
financial analysts or institutional investors in advance of a general
disclosure to the investing public.146

139. For example, one prominent analyst had internally described the same
stocks he had publicly recommended as “crap,” “dog[s],” and “a piece[s]
of junk.” Id. at 409.
140. Regulators Finalize $1.4 Billion Wall St. Settlement, N.Y. Times, (Apr.
28, 2003, 2:46 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/28/business/
regulators-finalize-14-billion-wall-st-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/
BEW5-4FPC].
141. See Letter from James A. Brigagliano, Assistant Dir., SEC Div. Trading
& Markets, to Dana G. Fleischman, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton,
(Nov. 2, 2004), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrnoaction/grs110204.htm [https://perma.cc/3R2T-MEB2].
142. 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2007).
143. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
144. Id. at 648.
145. Id. at 666–67.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2007).
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Regulation FD raises constitutional issues regarding the regulation
of speech because it does not regulate only harmful or false speech.147
The intrusiveness of Regulation FD and its overarching restraints on
commercial speech is illustrated by a case brought by the SEC against
the CEO at Schering-Plough Corp. that was settled by consent.148 The
SEC found in its settlement order that the CEO engaged in private
meetings with financial analysts.149 At those meetings, “through a
combination of spoken language, tone, emphasis and demeanor,” the
CEO disclosed material nonpublic information concerning a decline in
the company’s quarterly earnings.150 “After this enforcement action,
issuers learned that maintaining a poker face might be necessary to
avoid Regulation FD liability.”151
This concern with image, as well as speech control, is certainly
applicable to Elon Musk and his use of social media. For example, after
settling the SEC’s contempt proceeding, and with Tesla “shares once
again falling precipitously, Mr. Musk took to Twitter and posted an
emoji of a winking face,” possibly communicating to investors that “he
has another surprise up his sleeve.”152 Does this mean that the SEC now
regulates emoji interpretations, as well as voice tones and personal
demeanor?153

147. Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation
Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 84 (2005)
(describing Regulation FD as inconsistent with the First Amendment);
see also Susan B. Heyman, Rethinking Regulation Fair Disclosure and
Corporate Free Speech, 36 Cardozo L. Rev 1099, 1105 (2015) (same).
148. In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 3448461, 2003 WL 22082153 (Sept. 9, 2003).
149. Id. at *8.
150. Id. at *1.
151. Page & Yang, supra note 147, at 23. Nevertheless, this body language
speech apparently continues to be a common practice. As reported in the
Wall Street Journal: “Executives are forbidden from sharing nonpublic
information at closed meetings, but investors focus on their body language
and parse their language in the hopes of picking up a useful nugget or
two.” Liz Hoffman & Geoffery Rogow, Giant Investors Are Coming After
One of Wall Street’s Cash Cows, Wall St. J. (June 27, 2019, 4:59 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/giant-investors-are-coming-after-one-of-wallstreets-cash-cows-11561555988 [https://perma.cc/9JRC-CMXB].
152. Charley Grant, Investors Helped Build Tesla. They Could Undo It, Too,
Wall St. J. (May 24, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
investors-helped-build-tesla-they-could-undo-it-too-11558721830 [https://
perma.cc/HXC4-LXHD].
153. See Winking Face, Emojis.Wiki, https://emojis.wiki/winking-face/
[https://perma.cc/V5KN-7DST] (last visited Dec. 28, 2019) (providing
alternative definitions of winking emojis). What about confidential
internal Tesla emails from Musk to Tesla employees that have market
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In another Regulation FD case, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc,154 the
SEC was supported by a group of law professors acting as amici curiae.
They argued that Regulation FD was not subject to the First
Amendment because “there is essentially a securities exemption, where–
by the First Amendment provides no protection for speech regulated
by federal securities laws.”155 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York did not resolve the constitutional claims
because the disclosures were found not to have violated Regulation FD
(the company had previously disclosed the information, which was the
same defense used by Musk in the SEC contempt proceeding).156 The
district court did, however, caution that Regulation FD posed First
Amendment concerns because applying it an “overly aggressive
manner” could have a “potential chilling effect which can discourage,
rather than, encourage public disclosure of material information.” 157
G.

SEC Compelled Speech on Political Issues – Proxy Regulations

The conflict between the First Amendment and the SEC’s
commercial-speech-control requirements also arises in the agency’s
proxy voting rules. In Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash,158 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the appli–
cation of SEC proxy rules to a public and very political controversy
involving massive construction cost overruns and mismanagement by a
public utility.159 The stock of this utility company, the Long Island
Lighting Company (“LILCO”), was registered with the SEC.160
Consequently, the company and its shareholders were subject to SEC
effect when leaked? See Justin Bariso, This Email from Elon Musk was
(Briefly) Worth Half a Billion Dollars, Inc. (May 22, 2019), https://
www.inc.com/justin-bariso/this-email-from-elon-musk-just-may-be-an-evilstroke-of-genius-but-its-not-enough-to-save-tesla.html?cid=hmhero [https://
perma.cc/C3D6-XQWU] (describing such an email and questioning whether
Musk might have leaked it because it had “a close resemblance to what
Musk would like to share himself, were he not handcuffed by his [SEC]
settlement”).
154. 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
155. Page & Yang, supra note 147 at 6 n.26.
156. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing Musk’s tweets);
Siebel, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (“The regulation does not prohibit persons
speaking on behalf of an issuer, from providing mere positive or negative
characterizations, or their optimistic or pessimistic subjective general
impressions, based upon or drawn from the material information available
to the public.”).
157. Siebel, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
158. 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985).
159. Id. at 794.
160. Id.
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rules governing proxy contests, which require the filing with that agency
of proxy solicitations.161 LILCO sought to use those rules as both a
shield and a sword to prevent dissident shareholders from soliciting
proxies who sought to effect changes in company policies and structure.
One of the defendants in the LILCO case, John W. Matthews, was
a political candidate for the Nassau County Executive position and had
campaigned on an anti-LILCO platform.162 Matthews purchased enough
shares of LILCO stock to allow him, under SEC rules, to initiate a
proxy contest against LILCO management.163 A citizens group supp–
orted Matthews’s efforts to reform LILCO and published newspaper
advertisements attacking LILCO managers.164 LILCO filed suit claim–
ing that the advertisements were misleading and that Matthews and
the other defendants supporting the proxy contest had not complied
with SEC proxy-disclosure requirements.165 LILCO sought an injunc–
tion against such advertisements.166
The district court held that the SEC proxy rules did not apply to
the advertisements because the advertisements were protected under
the First Amendment.167 The Second Circuit reserved judgment on
whether the advertisements were protected by the First Amendment,
but reversed and remanded the matter for discovery on whether the
advertisements were, in fact, proxy solicitations.168 One of the Second
Circuit panel members dissented on the grounds that the First
Amendment protected the advertisements as political statements.169
This judge was of the view that LILCO “asks nothing less than that a
federal court act as a censor, empowered to determine the truth or
falsity of the ad’s claims about the merits of public power and to enjoin
further advocacy containing false claims.”170 In the aftermath of this
decision, the SEC amended its proxy rules to exclude statements on
proxy votes that are made in public speeches or in broadcast media,
including advertisements.171

161. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-9, -11 (1963).
162. Long Island Lighting Co., 779 F.2d at 794.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 795.
168. Id. at 795–96.
169. Id. at 797 (Winter, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 798.
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv)(A) (2019).
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H.

SEC Compelled “Shaming”172 Speech – Proxy Votes on Social Issues

SEC proxy regulations raise additional First Amendment concerns.
Among other things, they require a report to shareholders for their
annual meeting that contains a comprehensive review of the company’s
operations over the past year and supporting materials for proxy
votes.173 The SEC has used this report to compel issuers to publish and
take proxy votes on minority shareholder proposals, even when a
company’s board of directors opposes those proposals.174 These proxy
votes often seek to shame management into modifying company
operations to conform to particular ethical and social views.175
A leading case on what must be included for a proxy vote under
Rule 14a-8 is Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.176 The district court
ruled that the company had to publish in its proxy report information
describing the cruelty to geese inflicted by French suppliers of pâté.177
That shaming speech was required even though the company’s pâté
sales were immaterial in economic terms. Rather, the court’s decision
was premised on the “ethical and social significance” of the proposal.178
The SEC staff subsequently announced that shareholder proposals
raising “significant social policy issues” would generally not be excluded
from Rule 14a-8’s voting requirements.179 The SEC thus transitioned

172. “Shaming” speech is “the act or practice of attempting to embarrass a
person or group by drawing attention to their perceived offence,
esp[ecially] on social media.” Shaming, Collins English Dictionary,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/shaming [https://
perma.cc/4NTU-ZR8Z] (last visited Dec. 28, 2019).
173. Fast Answers: Form 10-K, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/
fast-answers/answers-form10khtm.html [https://perma.cc/4NTU-ZR8Z]
(last modified June 26, 2009) (“Although similarly named, the annual
report on Form 10-K is distinct from the ‘annual report to shareholders,’
which a company must send to its shareholders when it holds an annual
meeting to elect directors.”).
174. SEC Rule 14a-8 dictates the eligibility of such proposals. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8 (2019). Among other things, such proposals and supporting
statement may not exceed five hundred words and may be submitted only
by shareholders that own at least $2,000 or one percent of the securities
being voted. See id.
175. See Thomas Lee Hazen et al., Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises 667 (4th ed. 2016) (describing social-based proposals).
176. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985).
177. Id. at 556, 562.
178. Id. at 558–59, 561. But see Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 256–58 (1974) (holding that the state could not compel a newspaper
to print replies by persons criticized by the newspaper).
179. See Hazen et al., supra note 175, at 668–69.
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from a commercial-speech regulator to a political- and social-issuereferendum referee on shaming speech, a task for which it is ill-suited.
I.

SEC Compelled Shaming Speech – Executive Compensation Proxy
Votes

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)180 imposed even more compelled-shaming
speech-requirements on public companies through proxy votes. Those
requirements included shareholder votes on “golden parachutes”181 and
“say-on-pay” votes for compensation awarded to top executives.182 They
sought to curb executive compensation by publicly shaming executives
who receive out-sized pay packages.183 The requirements were added
after prior SEC compelled-shaming-speech requirements and other
governmental efforts to reduce executive compensation and golden
parachutes failed.184 The Dodd-Frank say-on-pay votes have been

180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
181. “Golden parachutes” are large compensation grants made to executives in
the event of a hostile takeover of their company. See Jerry W.
Markham, A Financial History of the United States From EnronEra Scandals to the Subprime Crisis (2004–2006) 93 (2011).
182. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010).
183. SEC regulations adopted under this authority require a non-binding
“advisory” shareholder vote on executive compensation and golden
parachutes. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and
Golden Parachute Compensation, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9178, 3463768, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,590 (Oct. 28, 2010).
184. See Jerry W. Markham, Excessive Executive Compensation—Why
Bother?, 2 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 277, 293–94 (2007). The SEC had earlier
sought to curb executive compensation by requiring top executives to
disclose their payouts in order to shame them and to arouse shareholder
ire. See Jerry W. Markham, The Politics of Executive Compensation, 34
Regulation 38, 41 (2011). That mandate led to further increases in
executive compensation. See Alex Edmans, Stop Making CEO Pay a
Political Issue, Harv. Bus. Rev. (July 18, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/
07/stop-making-ceo-pay-a-political-issue [https://perma.cc/3GB4-TYXU].
Congress sought to align executive compensation with shareholder
interests by restricting executive salaries through punitive taxation, but
allowing unlimited compensation through stock options. See Markham,
Excessive Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, supra. The result was
massive stock options grants and wholesale accounting manipulations at
Enron, WorldCom, and other large public companies. Those frauds drove
stock prices upward, allowing executives to reap profits from stock-option
exercises. See Markham, supra note 113, at 30, 617. Taxes on golden
parachutes were equally ineffective. See Markham, supra note 181, at 93–94.
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equally ineffective in curbing executive compensation. Indeed, executive
compensation has increased since their adoption.185
Dodd-Frank also requires shaming disclosures of the disparity
between the money paid to CEOs of public companies and that paid to
other employees.186 In implementing this provision, the SEC admitted
that “Congress did not expressly state the specific objectives or
intended benefits” of that provision, and that “the legislative history of
the Dodd-Frank Act also does not expressly state the Congressional
purpose” underlying that provision.187 So, the SEC simply made up its
own purpose and benefit. The agency asserted that this statute “was
intended to provide shareholders with a company-specific metric that
can assist in their evaluation of a registrant’s executive compensation
practices,”188 whatever that means.
In any event, the disparity in executive and worker compensation
has only increased since the passage of Dodd-Frank.189 This seems to
undermine any claim that these government requirements meet Central
Hudson’s requirements that restrictions on commercial speech must
“directly advance” the (rather suspect) governmental interest in
185. See Ira Kay, Did Say-on-Pay Reduce or “Compress” CEO Pay?, Harv.
L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/27/did-say-on-pay-reduce-orcompress-ceo-pay/ [https://perma.cc/HPH4-T32Z] (“Median S&P 500
CEO pay increased 27% for the 4 years after SOP [say-on-pay] implem–
entation relative to the 3 years preceding SOP.”). This compelled-speech
mandate has not achieved its goal of reducing executive compensation
because shareholders have generally approved executive compensation
and golden parachutes that have been submitted for say-on-pay votes. See
Kristin M. Davis & Neil M. Leff, Majority of Say-on-Golden-Parachute
Votes Receive Shareholder Support, Skadden: Insights (Jan. 2016),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/01/majority-ofsayongoldenparachute-votes-receive-sha [https://perma.cc/ZTE6-TXKP].
186. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010).
187. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9877, 34-75610, 80
Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105 (Aug. 18, 2015).
188. See id.
189. Diana Hembree, CEO Pay Skyrockets to 361 Times That of the Average
Worker, Forbes (May 22, 2018, 4:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
dianahembree/2018/05/22/ceo-pay-skyrockets-to-361-times-that-of-theaverage-worker/#1aea752d776d [https://perma.cc/GDG6-X55E] (describing
the growth in the disparity of pay between executives and workers).
Ironically, Elon Musk is the outlier in the overall disparity between CEO
and worker pay by reason of the fact that he was, by far, the highest
compensated executive at any public company in the United States in
2018. See Anders Melin et al., A 300% Surge Makes Pot CEO No. 2 in
Pay Ranking After Elon Musk, Bloomberg (May 17, 2019), https://
www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-highest-paid-ceos/ [https://perma.cc/
U3CE-6X4X].
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SEC Compelled Shaming Speech – “Conflict Diamonds”

Dodd-Frank additionally required the SEC to adopt regulations
requiring companies using “conflict diamonds” to investigate and
disclose the origin of those minerals.191 That compelled-speech require–
ment was designed to shame company officials and arouse shareholder
action against the purchase of those minerals.192 It was thought that
this shaming would shut off a source of funds for armed groups in the
Congo that were committing widespread atrocities and funding their
operations through the sale of diamonds and other minerals mined in
that region.193
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held in National Association of Manufactures v. SEC,194 that
the SEC’s rule implementing the Dodd-Frank conflict-mineral provision
ran afoul of the First Amendment. This was because, as the SEC
admitted, the rule was directed at “achieving overall social benefits”
rather than providing information affecting the economic interests of
investors.195 “By compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the
statute [and SEC rules] interfere[d] with th[e] exercise of the freedom of
speech under the First Amendment.”196
K.

SEC Compelled Shaming Speech – Climate Change Disclosures

In 2010, the SEC issued “guidance” for public companies’ required
shaming-speech disclosures regarding the effects of climate change on
their business models.197 The SEC backtracked on the scope of those

190. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980); see supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
191. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (2010).
192. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 545 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
193. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010) (describing
conflict minerals).
194. 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
195. Id. at 522.
196. Id. at 530 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
197. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9106, 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb.
8, 2010).

369

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Securities & Exchange Commission vs. Elon Musk & the First Amendment

disclosures after the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016.198
For instance, the SEC allowed Exxon Mobil to exclude a Rule 14a-8
shareholder proposal submitted by two pension fund investors that
would have required the company to set targets for emission reductions
under the Paris Climate Accord.199 Nevertheless, the State of New York
adopted the pension fund investors’ cause. The New York attorney
general sued Exxon Mobil over its disclosures, or lack thereof, relating
to the future effects of climate-change regulations on its business.200 The
state was seeking an injunction and $1.6 billion for shareholder
restitution. After a lengthy bench trial, a New York Supreme Court
judge dismissed the case.201 In the interim, several large companies have
announced possible climate-change-related costs on their future busi–
ness.202
These actions only confirm the fact that climate change is a social
and political issue that cannot be separated from commercial activities.
As the SEC noted in its 2010 guidance, climate change is the subject of
“intense public discussion.”203 “Scientists, government leaders, legis–
lators, regulators, businesses, including insurance companies, investors,
analysts and the public at large have expressed heightened interest in
198. See Alexandra Semenova, SEC Stops Prodding Companies to Detail
Climate Change Impacts, Bloomberg (July 16, 2018, 5:31 AM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-law/sec-stops-prodding-companies-todetail-climate-change-impacts [https://perma.cc/NS4Q-HDJB]. For more
on the scope of corporate disclosures under President Trump see infra
notes 215–218 and accompanying text.
199. See Corporate Climate Coups Averted, Opinion, Wall St. J. (June 2, 2019,
5:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-climate-coups-averted11559510064 [https://perma.cc/BAH7-Z2GB]. Undaunted, those same
pension fund investors thereafter submitted a Rule 14a-8 proposal seeking
the appointment of a board committee to oversee corporate strategy for
dealing with the effects of climate change. That proposal was included in
the company’s proxy materials but was rejected by shareholders. See id.
200. Corinne Ramey & Bradley Olson, New York Sues Exxon Over Climate
Change Disclosures, Wall St. J. (Oct. 24, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-sues-exxon-over-climate-change-disclosures1540404374 [https://perma.cc/U5WT-UXZM].
201. Pippa Stevens, Exxon Found Not Guilty in New York Climate-Change
Securities Fraud Trial, Ending 4-Year Saga, CNBC (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/10/exxon-did-not-mislead-investors-a-newyork-judge-ruled-on-tuesday.html [https://perma.cc/AY3N-JWRR].
202. Brad Plumer, Companies See Climate Change Hitting Their Bottom Lines
in the Next 5 Years, N.Y. Times (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/04/climate/companies-climate-change-financial-impact.html
[https://perma.cc/GX4V-QQJ7].
203. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9106, 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,290
(Feb. 8, 2010).
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climate change.”204 The State of New York’s action against Exxon Mobil
was also a viewpoint-driven attack that seeks to compel certain speech
in order to shame the company.205
The rise of the “social investor” further underscores the difficulty
of distinguishing viewpoint-driven commercial speech from purely
political speech in the context of climate change.206 Social investors seek
to influence corporate decision-making by investing in “green”
companies that do not adversely affect the climate.207 Numerous mutual
funds and investment advisory services cater to these investors by
selecting portfolios that conform to their social and political view–
points.208

IV. First Amendment Protection for Musk on Twitter
“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals.”209 First Amendment principles do not vary for new forms
204. Id.
205. State AGs’ Climate Cover-Up, Opinion, Wall St. J. (June 7, 2019, 6:10
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-ags-climate-cover-up-11559945410
[https://perma.cc/GL4S-QYJ4] (describing a law-school program funded
by a private foundation that expresses its social and political viewpoints
by paying the salaries of prosecutors, such as those in New York, who
agree to pursue “progressive clean energy, climate change, and
environmental legal positions”).
206. See Todd Millay, Social Investing: The Good, The Bad and Ugly, Forbes,
(Feb. 29, 2016, 3:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/toddmillay/2016/02/
29/social-investing-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/#5ea369c98ba0 [https://
perma.cc/RWH3-JM5A].
207. See George Kantchev & Sarah Kent, Funds Say Climate Change is Now
Part of Their Investing Equation, Wall St. J. (June 10, 2019, 10:09
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/funds-say-climate-change-is-now-partof-their-investing-equation-11560218940 [https://perma.cc/7ZQD-CBK3].
But see Heather Gillers, Calpers’ Dilemma: Save the World or Make
Money?, Wall St. J. (June 16, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/calpers-dilemma-save-the-world-or-make-money-11560684601
[https://perma.cc/PA6L-M6LE] (large government pension fund questions
climate change viewpoint limitations on investments in non-green companies).
208. Britton O’Daly, Beleaguered Money Managers Find Bright Spot in ESG,
Wall St. J. (July 11, 2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
beleaguered-money-managers-find-bright-spot-in-esg-11562846400 [https://
perma.cc/6YYQ-H7ST] (record amount invested in socially responsible
mutual funds); Dieter Holger, Startups Target Millennials With SocialInvesting Apps, Wall St. J. (June 10, 2019, 10:13 PM), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/startups-target-millennials-with-social-investing-apps11560219180 [https://perma.cc/B9BK-UPSM] (describing social investing
products).
209. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 205 (1985) (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
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of communication.210 “Substantial questions would arise if courts were
to begin saying what means of speech should be preferred or disfavored.
And in all events, those differentiations might soon prove to be
irrelevant or outdated by technologies that are in rapid flux.”211 Twitter
falls squarely within the scope of these observations. As the Supreme
Court has observed, Twitter and other social media provide “relatively
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds”212:
[O]n Twitter, users can petition their elected representatives and
otherwise engage with them in a direct manner. Indeed,
Governors in all 50 States and almost every Member of Congress
have set up accounts for this purpose. In short, social media users
employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First
Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’213

Social media by definition involves the provision and exchange of
social thoughts and activities, and it is thus content oriented.214 That
Twitter and other social media are now popular forums for public
debate on climate change is most notably demonstrated by mainstream
media’s interest in President Trump’s tweets on that issue,215 as well as
in other social and political “commercial” controversies he has fueled

210. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
211. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2009).
212. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (quoting
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
213. Id. at 1735–36 (citation omitted) (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).
214. See Social Media, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/social%20media [https://perma.cc/7VF9-CWDY] (“forms of
electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as
videos)”).
215. Frank Newport, Deconstructing Trump’s Use of Twitter, Gallup (May
16, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/234509/deconstructing-trumptwitter.aspx [https://perma.cc/M944-GEPW] (“Over three-quarters of
Americans say they see, read or hear about Trump’s tweets a lot or a fair
amount.”). The President particularly likes to deride climate change claims.
See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens
Its Attack on Climate Science, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.html [https://
perma.cc/Q9GT-XK82]; Twitter Mobilizes Meme Army After Trump
Suggests Snowstorms Disprove Global Warming, RT (Jan. 21, 2019, 10:24
AM), https://www.rt.com/usa/449315-trump-global-warming-snow-tweet/
[https://perma.cc/7M2N-CLRB] (Trump tweeted that he wished for “a little
of that old fashioned Global Warming right now!” after severe snowstorms
hit the U.S.).
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through Twitter.216 Trump’s tweets cause outrage for the millions who
oppose him politically, and mainstream media report relentlessly on the
purported lies by Trump on Twitter and elsewhere.217 Yet neither the
President, nor what he gleefully mocks as “fake news”—the mainstream
media218—are subject to SEC censorship or other prior restraints, and
for “good reason.”219 As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit observed in holding that Trump could not block critics
from accessing his Twitter account, the public debate over Trump’s
policies is historically heated and intense, but “as uncomfortable and as
unpleasant as it frequently may be, [that debate] is nonetheless a good
thing. . . . [I]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that the
best response to disfavored speech on matters of public concern is more
speech, not less.”220
Like Trump, Musk is a controversial figure. Like Trump, Musk is
brash, outspoken (indeed, barren of most speech filters), and combative
in his Twitter postings.221 Those traits have simultaneously propelled
216. The President has tweeted about numerous controversial issues that affect
commercial, as well as social and political, interests, e.g., the political and
commercial effects of tariffs on China and immigration restrictions. These
tweets can be found on the White House’s Twitter page. The White House
(@WhiteHouse), Twitter, https://twitter.com/whitehouse?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/XD57-UBJH].
217. For example, the Washington Post claimed that President Trump has
made more than 10,000 false or misleading statements while in office.
Glenn Kessler et al., President Trump has Made More Than 10,000 False
or Misleading Claims, Wash. Post (Apr. 29, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/29/president-trumphas-made-more-than-false-or-misleading-claims/?utm_term=.e5f70b55f155
[https://perma.cc/967Z-CM32].
218. Interestingly, this “mainstream” media is operated mostly by public
companies and other large commercial enterprises. See Democracy on
Deadline, PBS: Indep. Lens, https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/
democracyondeadline/mediaownership.html [https://perma.cc/UP6L-86HB].
219. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 728 (2012) (“The First
Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like,
and for good reason. Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the
beneficence of the state but from the inalienable rights of the person. And
suppression of speech by the government can make exposure of falsity
more difficult, not less so. Society has the right and civic duty to engage
in open, dynamic, rational discourse. These ends are not well served when
the government seeks to orchestrate public discussion through contentbased mandates.”).
220. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 240 (2d Cir.
2019).
221. See Aaron Pressman & Adam Lashinsky, Data Sheet—What Elon Musk
and President Trump Have in Common, Fortune (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://fortune.com/2018/08/20/data-sheet-elon-musk-president-trumptweets/ [https://perma.cc/85VG-NZ85]; Jordan Malter, Elon Musk Takes
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Musk to world-wide fame and made him otherwise unlikable on any
level, save for some who admire his paradigm-changing ventures.222 Like
Trump, Musk’s numerous, and sometimes erratic, pronouncements and
predictions, and his repartee with his critics on Twitter are sharply
debated and much criticized.223 Like Trump, Musk is waging war with
mainstream media; in Musk’s case, the media are fighting back with
harsh criticism of him and Tesla.224 Ironically, Trump and Musk are
also at loggerheads with each other over their respective viewpoints on
climate change.225
The SEC’s injunction blocking Musk’s tweets appears to hinge on
the Central Hudson exception from First Amendment protection for
Trump-Style Trash Talk to the Business World, CNBC (Aug. 10, 2018,
2:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/10/elon-musk-takes-trumpstyle-twitter-trash-talk-to-the-business-world.html [https://perma.cc/
4MV2-92QR]; Scott Austin & Samarth Bansal, 4,925 Tweets: Elon Musk’s
Twitter Habit Dissected, Wall St. J. (July 12, 2018), http://graphics
.wsj.com/elon-musk-twitter-habit-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/N7J5-LEW5]
(describing Musk’s far-ranging and controversial use of Twitter); Matthew
Belvedere, Billionaire Innovator Elon Musk is a ‘Force of Nature,’
Trump Infrastructure Advisor Says, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:26 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/10/billionaire-innovator-elon-musk-is-aforce-of-nature-trump-infrastructure-advisor-says.html [https://perma.cc/
UG8T-V73A].
222. As one source notes: “The jury is still out on Elon Musk, as it is for all of
us. But it’s likely he will one day be remembered as the greatest creative
innovator and entrepreneur of our time—unless, that is, he manages to
sabotage his own success.” Bill Murphy, Jr., With 11 Short Words, Elon
Musk Just Showed a Tiny Glimpse of Self-Awareness and Humility (This
Needs to Stop Right Now), Inc. (June 15, 2019), https://www.inc.com/
bill-murphy-jr/with-11-short-words-elon-musk-just-showed-a-tiny-glimpseof-self-awareness-humility-this-needs-to-stop-right-now.html [https://
perma.cc/7A9P-499D].
223. Sam Abuelsamid, Who Would Buy Tesla and Why?, Forbes (May 29,
2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/samabuelsamid/2019/05/
29/who-would-buy-tesla-and-why/#49d691863451 [https://perma.cc/2YRW
-WWQU]; Grant, supra note 152.
224. Jason Murdock, Elon Musk Attacks Media for ‘Relentlessly Negative’
Tesla Coverage, Newsweek (June 6, 2018, 7:26 AM), https://www.
newsweek.com/elon-musk-launches-fresh-attack-media-relentlessly-negativecoverage-1010868 [https://perma.cc/KXK9-2KPV]; Marina Koren, Elon
Musk’s Silly War With the Media, The Atlantic (May 24, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/elon-musk-teslatwitter-journalism/561086/ [https://perma.cc/P66A-F4FF].
225. That dispute was touched off by a tweet from Musk announcing his
resignation from the President’s Economic Advisory Council after Trump
withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate Accord. See Lucinda
Shen, Elon Musk Leaves President Trump’s Advisory Council After Paris
Agreement Exit, Fortune (June 1, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/
06/01/elon-musk-trump-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/KF9N-RC47].

374

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Securities & Exchange Commission vs. Elon Musk & the First Amendment

misleading commercial speech.226 Yet there is no such exception for the
President’s political or social speech carried out through either main–
stream media or Twitter. Surely no one could credibly argue that the
government can regulate or enjoin speech on climate change, even false
speech, by the President, a member of the press, or a concerned
citizen.227 The country depends on the First Amendment, not
government-appointed censors, to ferret out false statements on climate
change and other critical political and social issues.
Musk should be given equal protection in the expression of his
viewpoints about Tesla through Twitter.228 As Tesla’s CEO, Musk is a
leader in the debate over whether replacing fossil-fuel cars with electricpowered ones is a commercially viable proposition.229 Musk’s tweets on
the role of Tesla in making electric cars are, therefore, “inextricably
intertwined” with his political and social views about how Tesla is
accomplishing its politically and socially oriented mission of fighting
climate change.230 That intertwining should remove his tweets from the
category of commercial speech and place them in the arena of fully
protected political speech.231
226. See supra notes 93–101 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lorenzo v.
SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1099–1100 (2019) (holding that the SEC could bar
a person for life from working in the securities industry who disseminated
to investors false statements that were provided by his boss); SEC v.
World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535, 538–40 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that
a religious organization was not protected by First Amendment from the
application of federal securities laws to the organization’s misleading offer
and sale of bonds).
227. See supra Part II (discussing First Amendment protection even for false
political speech).
228. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2009) (“The
Government may not . . . deprive the public of the right and privilege to
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consid–
eration.”).
229. See generally, e.g., Fred Lambert, Elon Musk Posits Tesla Under Attack
by the Fossil Fuel Industry, What Do You Think?, Electrek (May 30,
2019, 1:43 PM), https://electrek.co/2019/05/30/elon-musk-tesla-underattack-fossil-fuel-industry/ [https://perma.cc/8PTF-LLN9] (reporting on
claims by Musk that Tesla is under attack from traditional car
manufacturers and the fossil fuel industry as a whole).
230. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing full First Amendment
protection for “inextricably intertwined” commercial and (even false) political
speech).
231. As the Dean of the Florida International University College of Law at
Miami presciently observed before Tesla debuted its first commercial
product:
Toyota advertising its hybrid car is a commercial message. “Fight
global warming” is a noncommercial, political message. Toyota
showing how you can and should fight global warming by
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To be sure, financial analysts, and at least some investors, read
Musk’s tweets and those tweets can and do affect Tesla’s stock prices.232
The SEC’s position takes on a high moral tone in claiming innocent
persons are defrauded when Musk’s tweets and taunts are wrong.233
Such rectitude is commendable on its face, but it ignores the basic
premise of the First Amendment. Truth is best discovered through free
and open debate rather than by the dictates of SEC bureaucrats, or by
lawyers schooled in that agency’s compelled-speech and censorship
standards.234
Leaving for another day the issue of the precise areas where
commercial-speech censorship is appropriate under the federal securities
laws,235 the SEC needs, at the least, to be restricted in its efforts to
purchasing a hybrid car would likely be mixed speech. The degree
of permissible regulation depends in part on whether the messages
are inseparable, or as the Court has stated, “inextricably
intertwined.”
Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to
Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 789, 796 (2007) (footnotes
omitted).
232. See, e.g., Robert Ferris, Tesla is Down 7% Thanks to Elon Musk’s
Tweets—He’s All but Wiped out the Gains Tesla Got for Settling with the
SEC, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/
05/tesla-shares-drop-nearly-5percent-after-musk-mocks-sec-on-twitter.html
[https://perma.cc/4MQJ-GQAK].
233. See In the Matter of Wealthfront Advisers, LLC, No. 3-18949, 2018 WL
6722756, at *3 (S.E.C. Dec. 21, 2018) (charging misleading tweets).
234. Musk’s twitter-sitter lawyers are under compulsion to follow SEC speech
mandates, which means they will be inclined to take an overly restrictive
approach in censoring Musk’s tweets. See SEC In re Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-47276, 2003 WL 193527 (Jan. 29, 2003) (describing Section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012), which requires attorneys
to monitor and report possible securities violations up the chain of
command of public companies); see also Kim T. Vu, Note, Conscripting
Attorneys to Battle Corporate Fraud Without Shields or Armor?
Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105
Mich. L. Rev. 209, 210–12 (2006) (describing the role of attorneys as
whistleblowers under Sarbanes-Oxley).
235. A harder line to draw is where the mainstream media or the Internet and
social media are used to commit fraud by, for example: (1) disseminating
intentionally false paid advertisements; (2) trading on advance
information about a newspaper article that will have a market effect when
published; and (3) perpetrating “pump-and-dump” schemes by publishing
on the Internet false information that manipulates stock prices. See, e.g.,
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (stating that the
Supreme Court is equally divided over the issue of whether a reporter
violated federal securities laws by trading on advance information
contained in a column in the Wall Street Journal that had a market effect
when published); SEC v. Wall Street Pub. Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 366
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censor speech on public policy issues in public forums such as social
media. Certainly, Musk’s tweets and Tesla’s role in society extend far
beyond the investment interests of a relatively few Tesla shareholders.
Shareholder concerns are far outweighed by the widespread public
interest in the high-profile role played by Musk on Twitter in the
vigorous and ongoing viewpoint-based debate over the future role of
electric cars.
The SEC should stop acting like investors’ over-protective parents.
It should let Musk tweet what he wants about climate change and let
investors make of that information what they will.236 As was the case
with Steve Jobs and Apple, the media’s intense scrutiny and criticism
of Musk’s tweets should negate any claim of reliance on the contents of
Musk’s tweets for investment purposes.237 If regulatory protection is,
nevertheless, deemed necessary to shield unsophisticated investors from
the rigors of free speech and public debate, the solution lies in the
practice of providing safe harbors for projections—a solution addressed,
somewhat ironically, in the In re Donald J. Trump Securities
Litigation.238
The SEC could expand the safe-harbor doctrine to include
statements made by company executives on social media. Such a
warning is preferable to suppressing viewpoint-driven commercial
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (remanding case of SEC enforcement action under the
anti-touting disclosure provisions of Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(b), and SEC anti-fraud rules); Markham, supra
note 181.
236. The SEC apparently believes that investors in public companies are too
unsophisticated to assess the value of uncensored public statements by
CEOs, even in forums where their accuracy is subject to media scrutiny.
Most investors in public companies, however, are highly sophisticated
financial institutions, such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance
companies, and banks. See Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap
Held by Institutions, Pensions & Invs. (Apr. 25, 2017, 1:00 AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926
/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions [https://perma.cc/5UJABPSQ]. Moreover, the principal investment concern with social media
posts is their short-term effects on stock prices. But so-called highfrequency traders overwhelmingly dominate short-term investment
strategies. Those traders use complex computer algorithms and high-speed
trading systems that should be sophisticated enough to assess the value
and truth of Twitter and other social-media postings. See generally Jerry
W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity Markets—
From Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 555 (2015).
237. See supra notes 130–135 and accompanying text.
238. 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Alan Horwich, A Call for the SEC
to Adopt More Safe Harbors That Limit the Reach of Rule 10b-5, 74 Bus.
Law. 53, 64–71 (2018) (describing various SEC-created safe harbors and
advocating for the broader use of such arrangements).
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speech. Investors would be advised by such an SEC regulation that they
should rely on only a company’s SEC-filed statements in making
investment decisions.239 Non-filed statements that a public company’s
officers made on social media could not be the basis of a claim that
such statements misled shareholders.240 If an officer is speaking officially
for a public company and the speaker wishes investors to consider that
information in their investment decisions, the company would have to
file the statement with the SEC.241 Otherwise, the statement simply
becomes a matter of debate just like any other aspect of protected free
speech in the United States.242

Conclusion
Gagging Musk’s unfiltered responses to critics by requiring that
securities lawyers apply SEC censorship rules through prior review of
Musk’s viewpoint-driven tweets conflicts with basic First Amendment
protections. The public’s right to hear Musk’s uncensored viewpointdriven tweets about Tesla’s role in combating climate change should
not be suppressed under the guise of commercial-speech regulation.
Protecting investors from erroneous or even false viewpoint-driven

239. Turning the settlement order in the Elon Musk contempt proceeding on
its head provides a template for such an exemption. That order requires
prior review of Musk’s communications relating to a long list of Tesla
activities, including production and sales, new business lines and forecasts
that Tesla had not previously publicly disclosed or which deviate from
prior forecasts that are “made in any format, including, but not limited
to, posts on social media (e.g., Twitter), the Company’s website (e.g., the
Company’s blog), press releases, and investor calls; and . . . any written
communication.” Order Amending Final Judgment as to Defendant Elon
Musk at 1, No. 1:18-cv-8865-AJN-GWG, SEC v. Elon Musk (S.D.N.Y.
April 30, 2019), ECF No. 47.
240. The benefit bestowed by an SEC license or reporting requirement would
be limited to public filings at the SEC that are equally available to all on
the SEC’s “EDGAR” system. See Filings and Forms, Secs. & Exch.
Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml [https://perma.cc/A83C-9TDR]
(last modified Jan. 9, 2017).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2012).
242. There is already precedent for such a limitation in Section 18(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It provides a private right of action for
persons relying on and damaged by an intentionally false statement made
“in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or
any rule or regulation thereunder.” Id. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen,
Fed. Judicial Ctr., Federal Securities Law 112 (3d ed. 2011),
available at https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/FedSec3d.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CGW4-DZYU] (describing Section 18(a) and noting
that courts have applied an “eyeball” test requiring a plaintiff to have
actually relied on filed materials and not similar information in other
documents published by an issuer).
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speech on social media should be up to the same free press that protects
us in our everyday political and social lives.
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